



Discourse on the Disbandment of *Front Pembela Islam* and Renegotiation of Democratic Ideas

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ABSTRACT

The Indonesian government, through a joint decision of the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Law and Human Rights, the Minister of Communication and Information, the Attorney General of the Republic of Indonesia, the Chief of the Indonesian National Police, and the Head of the National Counter-Terrorism Agency have designated the mass organization the *Front Pembela Islam* (FPI) as a prohibited organization. This decision has given rise to polemics and various discourse debates. The pros and cons of more robust public discourse are related to the problem of the idea of democracy. Some of the narratives agree because FPI has been considered a threat to democracy. Some other articulations refuse because this decision violates the principles of democracy itself. Through the perspective of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's critical discourse analysis, this paper attempts to examine the polemic of the discourse on the disbandment of the FPI and the renegotiation of the idea of democracy. Several essential notes were found: First, the plurality of responses to the discourse on the disbandment of the FPI was caused by the various articulation formations concerning the preference for the meaning of democracy. Second, democracy is an empty sign whose meaning will always be constantly negotiated. Third, the disbandment of FPI can be read as a concrete form of the ambivalence of democracy, which, in principle, is always fluid to be articulated by any narrative configuration.

Keywords

Articulation, democracy, hegemony, negotiation, subject position

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INTRODUCTION

One of the principles and objectives of a democratic state is to guarantee a space for 'competition', 'participation', and complete 'freedom' for citizens and society in general to participate and express their rights for the sake of their survival (Sorensen, 2003, p. 120). The dimension of freedom is one of the main bases in democratic values. How this principle of freedom can work and not cancel each other out, it is necessary to organize and manage a democratic system. Between the dimensions of 'freedom' and 'organization', this still often raises problems and debates at the same time. One of the basic questions is: First, how can the practice of freedom really work within the state system, because it is understood that the state itself is a concrete manifestation of the system

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of order? Second, how can the structuring and institutionalization of democracy guarantee that there will be no deviations that are contrary to the values of democracy itself? These two questions are still relevant to be asked, because there are still many concrete experiences that show paradoxical and ambivalent situations that occur in the process of structuring democracy. In the name of structuring democracy, the policy practices taken often actually violate the principles of democracy itself.

The post-reform social movement is an interesting topic study. The nature of the movement which was not merely ideological vis a vis with the repressive style of the new order, this movement continued to look for unique formulations related to the negation of subject-objects (Sulhan, 2019). In relation to the problem of democracy above, one of the interesting case experiences is the policy of disbanding and prohibiting mass organizations (ormas) in Indonesia. The most recent case is the decision to ban the FPI. The polemic that has been raised is more centered on claims to the legitimacy of the policy. In several cases of prohibition, the government builds claim that democracy requires a structuring process in order to run healthy. Democracy, of course, is not a free political system, but it always needs an order to regulate it. Policy rationalization is also built with a narrative that the dissolution of the organization can be carried out if the practice of mass organizations is considered to have seriously threatened the security aspects of democracy. Despite the criticism that has come, the government is still adamant that this step must be taken because of considerations of a democratic emergency. If decisions are not taken immediately, threats to security, sovereignty and democracy will be real. Sources of threats are mainly addressed to types of organizations that are considered to have radical tendencies, threaten the public interest and do not respect the diversity of society. Radicalism that takes its justification from religion is a serious challenge for a pluralistic society (Hardiman, 2018, p. 12).

One of the main considerations for the dissolution concerns the violation of Article 2 of Perpu No. 2 of 2017 in lieu of Law No. 16 of 2013 which reads that "Ormas are prohibited from engaging in acts of hostility towards ethnicity, religion, taste or group, committing abuse, blasphemy, or blasphemy against a religion that is adopted in Indonesia". Ormas are also prohibited from committing acts of violence, disturbing the peace and public order, or damaging public facilities and social facilities. The consideration of the material of this article finally determined that FPI had fulfilled the offense in question. With the practice so far carried out by FPI it is considered not in line with the principle of the existence of mass organizations in Indonesia and also leads to a form of radical practice that endangers the basic consensus of democracy and also the state ideology, namely Pancasila. The practices and activities of the FPI have been considered as a category of radical movements that are disturbing the security of the community.

Awareness of the threat of radicalism or religious fundamentalism has long been a serious concern of the state. The practice of radicalism has been considered to threaten the existence of the state, especially related to the basic consensus of the ideology of Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution and at the same time threatens the pluralistic nature of Indonesia. In Government Regulation Number 77 of 2019 it is stated about the importance of "counter terrorism" and radicalism policies in Indonesia. The government has made various efforts to counter radicalism to prevent the public from being exposed to radical ideas (Chaterine, 2019). Radicalism is considered an integral part of acts of terrorism. The state has issued Law No. 1 of 2002 concerning the Handling of Criminal Acts of Terrorism. Vigilance against organizations that are considered radical can actually be linked to vigilance against the threat of terrorism itself. The targets of terrorism are considered not only to cause state insecurity, but also to touch the dangers of the existence of state ideology. Since the issuance of the Law on terrorism crimes, the government and various state institutions have continued to develop a deradicalization and counter-terrorism policy locus in various important sectors. One of the ongoing efforts is the deradicalization policy (Hikam, 2016, p. 15)

Rescue claims in order to maintain the ideological basis of Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution are the dominant preferences that are often articulated. Not only targeting right-wing radicalism, which is widely articulated in religious movements that are considered radical, but also left-wing activities which are declared to be contrary to the ideological basis of the state and the 1945 Constitution. Since the New Order was established, there has been a decision to dissolve and ban

the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its supporting mass organizations (Narwaya, 2010, p. 111). MPRS Decree No. 25 of 1966 has confirmed the prohibition policy. Since the disbandment policy was issued, almost to this day there has been a ban on all activities deemed to have a communist ideology. In another space, the government also implements a policy of prohibiting organizations that are considered to have tendencies of radicalism and terrorism, and especially organizations that will threaten the ideology of Pancasila.

Prior to the case of the FPI disbandment policy, the government in 2017 had also decided the same thing for the Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) organization. On July 19, 2017, the government through the Ministry of Law and Human Rights, officially revoked the legal status of HTI based on the Decree of the Minister of Law and Human Rights No. AHU-30.AH.01.08 of 2017. HTI defended and submitted an appeal to the Administrative Court. However, this attempt failed because the Administrative Court rejected all demands from HTI. In the judge's decision it was stated that HTI was proven to intend to change the state ideology and at the same time as an organization that was contrary to Pancasila. HTI is considered not to carry out the principles, characteristics and characteristics of mass organizations that have been determined in the Ormas Law no. 17 of 2017 that every mass organization in Indonesia must "not conflict with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. The basis of considerations applied to the dissolution of HTI is also used for cases of banning FPI. One of the main considerations is to maintain the existence of state ideology and consensus, namely Pancasila, the 1945 Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, the integrity of the Republic of Indonesia and Bhineka Tunggal Ika (Liputan6, 2020)

The government's decision led to a reaction as well as a polemic of attitudes that balked at those who agreed with the decision. Various attitudes of support or disapproval are articulated in various basic claims and consideration preferences that are considered adequate. The government in this case, of course, has a strong position in assuming that the decision to dissolve it is the right step and in accordance with the prevailing political and legal mechanisms. Through the official statement submitted, the government has at least several basic reasons: first, since 20 June 2019, FPI has not been registered and legalized as a registered mass organization, aka has been disbanded: second, although it is not registered, many activities of FPI have been carried out. disturbing security, order and lawlessness (CNN Indonesia, 2020). However, one reason clause that is also the subject of consideration is that FPI activities will not only threaten security and democratic principles, but are also considered to be related to the activities of radical organizations that threaten the existence of the Pancasila ideology (Adyatama, 2020)

Based on these considerations, the government has declared FPI as a prohibited organization and stopped all activities that use FPI's attributes, symbols and names. However, apart from the rational considerations written in the joint decree (SKB), the public reacted to the decision in various ways. The dominant public response touched the locus of the debate about whether or not the decision to disband was in line with democratic principles. Not a few parties see this as a form of government political arbitrariness that does not at all heed the principles of democracy. However, not a few parties see that the decisions taken by the government are correct and are still within the corridor of democracy. Furthermore, this decision is an attempt to save democracy. Not only on the meaning of democracy, this government decision also touches on the articulation of how the politics of security and sovereignty are expressed. The government and the supporting parties see that this step is an important part of saving the Pancasila ideology and state sovereignty. This security approach is considered relevant and very appropriate.

From the various different responses, at least there is an interesting phenomenon that is very important to read that the meaning of democracy or the problem of sovereignty itself is never fixed. In the context of the moment of the disbandment of FPI, the meaning of 'democracy' continues to be seen as being renegotiated and even contested by various discourses for its meaning. Various parties try and try to interpret with different articulations of meaning. Every articulation that exists seeks to assume it is the most correct. Every articulation of ideas tries to seize its hegemonic position. As a phenomenon of political discourse, of course this is a very interesting theme to study. At least there is a locus of study and problem formulation that can be elaborated on how the meaning of democracy is articulated and renegotiated by various subject positions.

FPI's disbandment was officially decided on December 30, 2020. Because the moment of the event was still relatively new, several studies or specific research on this issue had not yet been carried out. However, regarding the large locus on the polemic of "dissolution of mass organizations", a lot has been done. It's just that a more insightful study on the perspective of Laclau and Mouffe's critical discourse analysis has not been carried out. Research studies are still mostly focused on political issues as well as legal aspects. Almost the same thematic has actually occurred in the polemic about the discourse on the disbandment of Hizbur Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in 2017. The consensual perspective of the ideology of Pancasila is most often used as one of the categories for evaluating a mass organization. Marfiando's (2020) research work entitled "The Dissolution of Hizbur Tahrir Indonesia (HTI) in View from Freedom of Association" still states that the disbandment of mass organizations can be allowed if it is contrary to the basic principles of Pancasila. This formal legitimacy approach becomes the basis of the analysis that normative freedom of association requires restrictions. From a legal perspective, there are several views that "under certain conditions" an Ormas can be dissolved by the government through a legal decision. The Journal article written by Latifah (2020) in the DPR RI Journal entitled "Human Rights Protection in the Mechanism of Dissolution of Legal Entity Ormas Based on Law Number 16 of 2017" provides an analysis of the legality of the dissolution of mass organizations by prioritizing the protection of human rights, especially rights in court. Which happened in the case of the dissolution of mass organizations in Indonesia was mostly without heeding these principles.

Latifah (2020) gave an important note about the need for additional revisions to the legality of the existing Perpu so that it covers aspects of protecting human rights for mass organizations in Indonesia. This paper also places the possibility that a mass organization can be frozen with certain considerations. Legally normatively, all authority is fully in the matter of disbanding or freezing mass organizations - such as in the case of the decision to dissolve HTI - the government through Jakarta Administrative Court Decision No. 211/G/2017/PTUN/Jakarta and based on considerations that are fully decided by the government. HTI is considered to have the potential to threaten the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia and is contrary to the principles of the Pancasila ideology. The right of association can be limited and at the same time revoked if it violates these provisions.

The writings by Damaitu and Wada (2017) also puts an important note on the great authority in the hands of the government. Damantu and Wada's writings do not discuss the HTI case, but instead highlight how the FPI issue must immediately get a firm stance from the government. Various violent practices, persecution and anarchic actions against the law carried out by FPI can clearly become the basis for the process of disbanding or freezing these mass organizations. Several other published writings tend to portray the FPI theme in the context of a historical approach as well as several study themes related to issues of theological faith.

The topic of research on the 'dissolution of mass organizations' has been relatively widely discussed, but the specific method through critical discourse analysis in Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) post-structuralist perspective has not been widely developed. Therefore, the theme with a review of this analytical approach is very interesting to work on. At least this research can contribute to a wider perspective in viewing the spectrum of the issue of the existence of CSOs in the large landscape of discourse on 'democracy'. What is one of the distinguishing principles from those carried out by many previous studies is that Laclau and Mouffe's point of view sees the issue of democracy not in an essentialist, functionalist and instrumentalistic perspective, but reaches a deeper interpretation of how the meaning of the idea of democracy always lies in dynamic and changing tensions.

Several studies have tried to conduct analysis on the topic of FPI disbandment through other critical discourse analysis approach. Using Norman Fairclough's approach, Suryawati and Jamalullail's (2021) research was more aimed at uncovering the importance of the meaning behind the text of the news on the disbandment of FPI. Through Fairclough's analysis, Suryawati and Jamalullail concludes that the media production process tends to produce news texts that support the disbandment policy. Using different approach to discourse analysis, Fitri et al. (2021) examining the issue of FPI disbandment through the Teun Van Dijk approach that is more concerned with the structure of the news text. The result of Fitri et al.'s (2021) study found that the media tended to support the FPI disbandment policy. In both studies, the journal has not yet explored how the

meaning of democracy and security politics is articulated and negotiated by the various subject positions. Thus, this study offers a different way of looking at the same topic regarding FPI's disbandment policy.

Beyond the principle of essentialism regarding text, language or discourse, Laclau & Mouffe's (2001) approach with a post-structuralist perspective is very relevant to be developed. First, in Laclau & Mouffe's perspective, politics and democracy are not a definitive and fixed conceptual entity. Politics, democracy, power and other concepts are just a 'floating signifier' that will continue to be negotiated and always change depending on how the configuration of the discourse about it moves and changes. Second, various concepts or discourses always exist in a space that continues to be contested to compete with each other for their hegemonic positions. In Laclau & Mouffe's perspective, understanding discourse as well as the concept of 'democracy' is not a fixed text structure resulting from a consensus product which is assumed to bind the agreement of each party rationally. Discourse has always been a realm that is constantly negotiated and articulated (Laclau & Mouffe, 2000 p. 105). Democracy is not and will never be a 'finished good' or something 'fullness' and 'decidable', so it can be predicted and phased as a 'historical necessity'. Democracy is a 'floating signifier' that is constantly moving along with the actions and political struggles that fill it (Robert, 2008, p. 65).

This study examines and deepens the discourse on the polemic of discourse on government policies regarding the decision to dissolve the FPI mass organization in 2020. Specifically, this article analyzes how the meaning of democracy is articulated and negotiated by various subject positions. The urgency of this research is to see that political discourse is not merely a binary and black-and-white matter in explaining differences of opinion. With the critical discourse analysis Laclau & Mouffe (2001), it can be expected to find various relationships and deeper articulations to understand the negotiation and contestation of the meaning of democracy related to the political issue of the disbandment of the FPI mass organization. Through Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) choice of critical discourse analysis, this article offers a new form of analysis in understanding discourse. The flow of analysis can be started by finding various elements (elements) of discourse, then developed to find hegemonic moments of articulated discourse. From these specific moments, it will be seen that the configuration of discourse and the hegemonic positions that exist temporally in the struggle for various meanings of 'democracy' will be seen.

METHOD

The research method in this research uses a qualitative paradigm with Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) critical discourse analysis approach. The main umbrella of this research is the 'Post-Structuralist' perspective which focuses on the analysis dimension of 'text language', especially in the dimension of 'discourse articulation' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2000). In Laclau & Mouffe's perspective, the issue of democracy related to the issue of the disbandment of the FPI will be approached with a discourse analysis. Discourse analysis was chosen to explore various forms of discourse articulation around the discourse on the disbandment of FPI. Laclau & Mouffe's discourse analysis itself provides a means to observe and explore issues of text articulation, language, discourse and non-discourse dimensions related to discursive practice. Discourse itself is understood as the determination of meaning in a particular domain (Jorgensen & Phillips, 2002, p. 26)

The practice of articulation in Laclau and Mouffe's (2001) understanding is interpreted as a social act, because social acts are always open to constitutionalizing with all existing discursive identities and social structures (Narwaya, 2021). Articulation practice can be interpreted as the construction of meeting points (nodal points) whose permanent meaning is partial. A discourse can never be single, total and valid (Boucher, 2008, p. 81). Every social practice is 'contingent' and always prone to be deconstructed and reconstructed by subsequent 'meeting points' (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 113). Discourse is always presented in its specific (specific) formulations and formations and always intersects with the plurality of other discourse contexts that form it (Barker, 2004, p. 54-55). That is, understanding the meaning of a discourse requires the work of observing the formation of discourse around the existing nodal points.

For Laclau & Mouffe (2001), all non-discourse dimensions are also considered as part of discourse (Jorgensen & Phillip, 2002). Data collection methods were carried out through various

explorations of document data collection, media observations and reviews of relevant literature. Sources of research data are taken from relevant primary and secondary data. Primary data can be obtained from official government statements, community institutions, or certain subject positions. Some data are recorded in media reports, but are also documented in the official records of the relevant institutions. Secondary data is obtained from references such as the results of studies and research that have been carried out or other important information recorded in various document sources.

In summary, it can be illustrated the technical flow of discourse analysis developed by Laclau & Mouffe (2001) to facilitate the description of the analytical method of this research. The first stage is to explore and compile various articulations of various discourses on the issue of the disbandment of the FPI with their various perspectives. This initial stage is to read how the articulation practice is depicted. The second stage is to explore and find the 'subject position'. In Laclau & Mouffe's analysis, the 'position of the subject' is the result of discourse (Smith, 1998, p. 88). It is shaped by how the configuration of the discourse takes place. After understanding the various elements, moments and praxis of articulation, it will be possible to find the 'subject position' of discourse. The position and identity of the subject is always organized in a 'relational' way.

The third stage is to explore and explore the antagonisms that exist in each discourse and the hegemonic positions that exist in the ongoing discourse contestation. Antagonism and meaning hegemony are not always permanent and fixed (Laclau & Mouffe, 2001, p. 115). So, this stage is also to look at the various dynamics of 'points of equivalence' (points of equivalence) and 'points of difference' (points of difference) in every relationship between existing discourses. The fourth stage further explores critically the discursive relationship between the issue of the dissolution of the FPI and the problem of the meaning of democracy. This last point is at the same time able to see the hegemonic moments that occur in the meaning of discourse about democracy.

FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

The polemics and pros and cons of the discourse on the disbandment of FPI are interesting to be studied through a more critical study. This issue is not only a question of seeing who supports and who rejects the government's decision, but also concerns how the meaning of democracy is constantly being negotiated. At least from the results of the search for developing discourse moments, it was found that there were at least 4 (four) articulation positions that emerged (dominant). First, of course the official discourse from the government as the position of the subject who made the decision to ban the FPI. The government's articulation is certainly in the most agreed pole on the disbandment. Second, the articulation of ideas that reject the discourse on the disbandment of FPI. In this articulation position, of course, the subject is in the position of FPI and its supporters; Third, the articulation of ideas that reject the disbandment policy but not with a preference for supporting FPI's steps, but with other considerations preferences. Fourth, the parties who agree on the policy steps but with different consideration preferences from what was prepared by the government. The positions of the third and fourth types of articulation are mostly discussed by pro-democracy civil society groups, but with various variations in the preferences of the considerations proposed.

This paper, of course, does not merely explore what the various subject positions express, but rather wants to see how these various articulation positions define what is understood as democracy. This paper at the same time wants to see how each articulation of these various discourse positions builds preferences and references for their respective meanings. Of course, not all the articulations scattered in the various traces of their statements must be studied all. This research will only take some of the dominant articulations in each recorded discourse position. The next analysis task will describe and explore each of these articulations and show the dominant preferences referred to. This preference will be able to describe what meaning is being built by each of the existing discourse positions.




Figure 1. The Four Dominant Articulation Positions

Prior to the decision to disband FPI, the government had given a policy stance that tends to judge that what FPI has done does not meet the principles of Ormas which must comply with the principles of the applicable laws and regulations. Since June 20, 2019, de jure has disbanded as a mass organization. As an organization, FPI has also carried out activities that are considered to be against the law, such as playing the judiciary itself, acts of violence, sweeping and also provocations that lead to situations of insecurity (CNN Indonesia, 2020). The government's decision was also supported by FPI's involvement in evidence and data on acts of terrorism committed by FPI members and sympathizers. According to the government, there are around 35 who have been proven to have committed acts of terrorism and 29 of them have been charged with criminal offenses. This means that it can be said that the preference for radicalism and the danger of terrorism is one of the considerations to strengthen the argument for the decision that the FPI has completely contradicted the principles of Indonesian democratic law.

However, before the polemic got stronger over the response to the disbandment of FPI, it had been preceded by a polemic about the legality of FPI which since June 21, 2019 has ended its legal status, and when the legal status is no longer renewed through a Registered Certificate (SKT), then automatically de jure FPI has disbanded. Not only on the debate about the legal status, the debate on the legal status of the FPI lies materially in the clauses of the FPI's AD/ART, especially because it does not include the principle of Pancasila ideology. For the government, the inclusion of the Pancasila principle is a mandatory provision. Because FPI did not include this point in the Articles of Association, the government still did not allow FPI's legal status to be extended. The cases in question increased because FPI actually included a vision and mission in article 2 regarding the struggle "the kaffah application of Islamic law under the auspices of the Islamic caliphate according to Nubuwwah's manhaj through the implementation of da'wah, enforcement of hisbah and the practice of jihad". According to the Ministry of Home Affairs, the contents of Article 6 are still unclear, even though the Ministry of Religion has given a recommendation letter because the FPI statement is stamped on each letter on Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution. In the theological dimension according to the Ministry of Home Affairs, it is very good, but if it is put in the dimensions of the state system, the narrative of the FPI's vision and mission will conflict with the principles of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and at the same time the basic foundation of Pancasila (Kiswondari, 2019).

The government's disbandment of FPI as well as the narratives uttered by its supporters are also not considered to be contrary to democratic principles and are not considered to violate the principle of freedom of association and assembly. Several arguments for the support of this discourse are articulated in several reasons: First, democracy is not a system that means as free as possible, but also has limitations. This limitation is in the agreed democratic rules, including its relation to the freedom of others for the government. FPI's actions and activities have been proven to disturb the peace, security and freedom of others (Albanna, 2020). Second, FPI activities are a

form of threat to the freedom of others, conditions of tolerance and also threaten the existence of Pancasila and the Republic of Indonesia. Third, responding to criticism of the policy of disbanding without a judicial process, the government through the Deputy Minister of Justice and Human Rights, Edi Hierej stated that this step was appropriate with the basis of the Ormas Law itself and at the same time the basis for the decision of the Constitutional Court (MK) No 80/PUU-XI/2013 on December 23, 2014 (Ramadhansari, 2020). So, with the issuance of the Decree on December 30, 2020, all activities and the use of the FPI symbol are declared prohibited.

Several political party figures, civil society activists and also leaders of religious mass organizations have fully supported the government's decision. There are several similar narratives, but there are also some that differ in providing supporting arguments. First, the government's action has been deemed appropriate because the FPI's practice of action so far has been far from trying to create social conditions that are harmonious, peaceful and mutually tolerant. Second, the act of disbanding and banning the FPI does not contradict the principles of democracy, because in principle the rights of freedom and expression of citizens can be limited if they violate several boundary principles, such as threatening the freedom of others and disturbing public order. Third, acts of vigilantism, violence, persecution and provocation of hatred that have been frequently practiced by FPI are actions that are already contrary to the basic values of the Pancasila ideology, especially the tendency of religious radicalism that is often shown by FPI.

The democratic preference for the voices of support is more interpreted as a process of respecting civil liberties but must be within the framework of not harming other people and the public interest. As long as democratic activities have threatened and interfered with the freedom of others, they can be restricted and even prohibited. Democracy is not an attitude without boundaries. It needs an arrangement so that democracy can become a common space not to exclude one another. Political observer Ade Armando, a proponent of government policies, asserts that it is feasible to impose limitations on community organizations within a democratic country (KOMPASTV, 2021). Armando's viewpoint refers to Article 29 of the 1946 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which has been ratified in the Indonesian legal system, which stipulates that freedom of association and assembly can be subject to limitations under specific circumstances (KOMPASTV, 2021, 6:42). Organizational restrictions can be made in order to protect the rights and freedoms of others. Organizational freedom can also be restricted for the sake of morality, public order and for the general welfare.

The discourse of support for the steps taken by the government to ban FPI also refers to the basis of Article 28 (e) of the 1945 Constitution which states that everyone has the right to freedom of association, assembly and expression and also Article 28 (j) paragraph 2 which also states that it is possible the existence of restrictions with the aim of recognizing and respecting the rights and freedoms of others, to fulfill moral considerations, religious values, security and order. So in Armando's view, considering the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as the 1945 Constitution, the dissolution and prohibition of an organization can be carried out as long as there are strong reasons for the decision to disband (KOMPASTV, 2021). The prohibition of HTI organizations in various democratic countries proves that the matter of actually banning organizations is also common. The strongest reason for the disbandment of FPI was also in the aspect of the vision of the establishment of Islamic law and a caliphate state which according to Armando was clearly anti-Indonesian, anti-democratic and also anti-human rights.

Mohammad Guntur Romli, an activist with the Indonesian Solidarity Party (PSI) and an activist with Nahdatul Ulama (NU), expressed support for the government's decision. One of the strongest reasons is because the main vision of FPI which is to establish an Islamic Khilafah and clearly contradicts the basic principles of Pancasila. Romli's view emphasizes that the ban on FPI does not conflict with democratic values and also does not conflict with human rights. Discourse about the threat of radicalism that endangers democracy. Referring to the view of Abdulrahman Wahid (Gus Dur), for Romli's view, FPI is classified as a criminal organization and even as a terrorism broker (COKROTV, 2021). Freedom of association cannot be applied to FPI which has robbed other people of their freedom. Not only as a form of ordinary crime, what FPI has done has become a form of structured crime.

One of the attitudes that reject the decision to ban this is based on the consideration that this policy is undemocratic and even shows an authoritarian character. One of the considerations for the accusation was that the disbandment of FPI did not go through a court procedure. The legal basis of the courts is considered as one of the characteristics of a democratic rule of law. The government may not unilaterally and arbitrarily make a ban decision. If this is done, then the government has revoked the basic rights of assembly and association which in the principles of a democratic state are guaranteed life. Fadli Zon, one of those critical of rejecting this policy, said that the government's move had silenced and killed democracy (Fitriani,, 2020). Even Fadli Zon saw the politicization of law and the manifestation of authoritarianism that killed democracy (Budiman, 2021).

Meanwhile, several democratic civil society activists also expressed their views. The Commission for Disappeared Persons and Victims of Violence (Kontras) and the Coalition of Civil Society expressed a common voice and attitude in responding to this government decision. They have firmly judged that the decree issued regarding the prohibition and dissolution of the FPI contradicts legal principles, especially regarding freedom of assembly and association. The same critical stance was also expressed by the International Amnesty Institute, which argued that the policy of banning FPI had the potential to discriminate and violate the rights of association and expression and further undermine civil liberties in this country (Siswanto, 2020). The Director of YLBHI, Asfinawati, also criticized the government's decision. According to him, legal wrongdoing such as the disbandment of the FPI could further undermine the rule of law and democracy (Siswanto, 2020). The attitude taken by Kontras, Amnesty International or YLBHI did not stand on political support for FPI but adhered to values, namely the principles of law enforcement and democracy correctly. Their discourse articulation puts the principles of implementing law and democracy correctly and must be carried out with the principles of correct law enforcement as well. The judicial process is very important to be able to see transparently the issues that are being questioned, not through political policies that will actually damage the law and democratic values.

According to Asfinawati, if there is an individual error in FPI, then FPI should not immediately be dissolved as an organization. Long before the government's decision was made, YLBHI had expressed its stance that FPI would still be given room in democracy. If you want to disband a mass organization, it must go through an open and accountable judicial process so that the public can also see it. The trial must be conducted fairly and comprehensively by including strong evidence (Prabowo, 2019). The policy to provide space or restrictions for FPI is a form of legal and democratic gamble. One of the lecturers and political observers at Airlangga University Surabaya, Airlangga Pribadi, also emphasized his rejection of the disbandment of FPI. In Airlangga's view, the narrative of the disbandment of the FPI could be a serious threat to democracy, not only today but also in the future. The decision to disband FPI can serve as an alibi as well as an excuse for the regime's actions to weaken the forces of democratic society itself (Umar, 2021). Dissolution without a judicial process will only lead to a counterproductive process for the functioning of democracy.

From several discourses that have been emphasized by groups of Islamic organizations that have close ties to FPI, such as those who are members of the National Movement to Guard Fatwa (GNPF), MUI does not explicitly take preference on democratic values. In their statement of refusal, the narrative that was built puts that the struggle carried out by FPI does not conflict with the principles of state law. They stated that what he did was a form of state and religious expression that were not contradictory to each other. They assume that what they are doing is also to protect the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia. Not a few saw that what was done in the government's policy was a very repressive and anti-Islamic step, although the accusation was later denied and clarified by the government (Budilaksono, 2019). Several large Islamic institutions such as NU and Muhammadiyah also emphasized that the government was not anti-Islam. In his statement, Marsyudi Syuhud, Chairman of PBNU stated that the disbandment of FPI did not mean that the government was anti-Islam (Soetomo, 2021). The same narrative was also issued by Muhammadiyah, they also stated that what the government did to ban the FPI was not an expression of anti-Islam (Makdori, 2020)

Important findings that can be obtained from the diversity of discourses above are at least two major discourses regarding the rejection and acceptance of government decisions. However, from

the discourse that supports or rejects it can be divided into four types of discourse with varying preferences regarding what is understood about the principles and meaning of democracy. First, of course, the discourse that fully supports the prohibition. The government is the main subject that issues the statement. Democracy is placed as one part of the reason. FPI is considered not in line with the principles of democracy which is the basic consensus of the political system. FPI's actions which are contrary to Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution will indirectly threaten democracy. The government as the holder of the authority for structuring democracy has the right to take appropriate action so that the basic democratic consensus that is reflected in the values of Pancasila is not threatened.

The second dominant articulation is of course declared by FPI to be the subject of this decision. In the official stance, FPI does not explicitly state democratic preference points, but if we look further, the discourses that are raised outside of official statements are closely related to democratic preferences. The accusation against a government that has been very reflexive and authoritarian, of course, refers to the meaning of democracy. The FPI disbandment policy is a concrete form of oritarian expression and of course he wants to state the content of an 'anti-democratic' policy. FPI's defense also referred to the pretext that what FPI did did not violate the principles of democratic expression which must also be given a place in the democratic space. Some other slices see that there is no strong enough reason for this decision. This decision was seen as an attempt to get rid of FPI from the start because it had always been in opposition to the legitimate government.

The third form of articulation that is also dominant comes from democratic civil forces who see that the government's steps provide a bad picture and precedent for the democratic space. The government's decision will be considered invalid if it is based on the objectivity of the matter through a valid legal court process. The growing articulation assumes that what the government is doing is clearly not in accordance with democratic principles, namely through full respect for open and fair legal mechanisms. If the government considers that decisions can be made because democracy also knows its limits, but for this group's discourse, disbanding and prohibiting them without due process will actually threaten the pillars of democracy itself.

The tendency of the fourth dominant discourse position is the parties who support this decision. But this support is not because they are part of the government's interests. Support for this decision is considered for reasons that look at the context of FPI's ideological existence. The articulation of this support refers to the analysis that historically and ideologically FPI itself was formed as a violent civilian militia organization which was actually formed because of the intersection of state interests to fight the expressions of democratic civilian groups. In this regard, it is clear that FPI is positioned as an anti-democratic organization. For this reason, the disbandment and banning of the FPI has actually reduced some of the anti-democratic forces in Indonesia.

CONCLUSION

From some of the findings of the discussion and analysis above, this research can get at least 4 (four) important conclusions. First, the context of the FPI disbandment case has shown the important reality of how political discourse about democracy cannot be read in a mere normative, formal and functional framework. In the context of a political polemic case, each party can use the same claim, namely by arguing with a democratic foundation. Second, looking at the diversity of views on democracy itself, it can be said that in the end democracy is not a final and fixed concept. In the context of the FPI case, the notion, understanding and meaning of democracy can be so flexible and fluid that it can be drawn everywhere in order to become a legitimacy sentence for the articulation of the discourse that is formed. Both supporters and opponents of the FPI disbandment policy both use democratic preferences. The third note that is also very important is that the choice of the democratic narrative turns out that each has a point of difference, especially the preference tendencies presented. It can be seen that even though they both have the same nodal points and points of equivalence regarding democracy, at the same time they also provide points of equivalence on the meaning of existing democracy.

The fourth finding sees that temporally, several illustrations of the diversity of discourses on the meaning of democracy in the context of the disbandment of mass organizations, still show the

success of the hegemonic position on democracy which is interpreted as an expression that must be in line with the basic consensus of the state ideology. Why the decision was successfully carried out is not far from how the discourse on the importance of respecting the basic political consensus, both Pancasila, the UUD 1945 of Indonesia has always been the dominant articulation that has not been displaced and has always been the main matrix in policies restricting the arrangement of democracy. Most of the discourse on support for government policies is also carried out on the preferences of the discourse points on the basic consensus. As long as the imagination of the meaning of the basic consensus is still a strong nodal point, during that time it will still have great power to become hegemonic narratives in the management and arrangement of democracy.

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